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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez: TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP AND THE
INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Vieno Lindstrom
In 1968 Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).' The
"Indian Bill of Rights"' was included as part of the Act and it imposed on all Indian tribes the duty, when exercising acts of selfgovernment, to accord all persons most of the same basic constitutional rights that are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the Federal
Constitution. There were certain specific exceptions and changes
due to the unique character of Indian tribal life. However, the section of the Act with which this article is concerned, the equal protection clause,3 was incorporated into the Act with much of the
same wording as that found in the Federal Constitution. This
clause states that "[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self
government shall... (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of its laws." The interpretation of this clause
by the courts, especially in regard to whether it provides a basis
for federal court jurisdiction over cases involving tribal membership conflicts, and its application to the case of Santa ClaraPueblo
v. Martinez, is the subject of this paper.'
Santa ClaraPueblo v. Martinez
Martinez concerns the validity of a 1939 Santa Clara Pueblo
membership ordinance which precludes membership for children
of female members of the Pueblo who had married nonmembers,
but grants membership to children of male members of the Pueblo
who had married nonmembers.' The suit was brought by Julia
Martinez and her daughter Audrey as a class action against the
Pueblo and its governor, alleging that the membership ordinance
contravenes the equal protection and due process provisions of the
ICRA.
Julia Martinez is a member of the Pueblo who had married a
Navajo. Due to the ordinance, the children of Julia and her hus-

1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
3. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8).
4. 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
5. Id. See also Note, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection: Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo-Sexual Equality Under the Indian CivilRights Act, 6 Am.INDIAN L. REV. 187 (1978).
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band are not recognized as members of the Pueblo. The ordinance
had been enacted by the Council, the Pueblo's single governing
body, under powers given to it in a constitution adopted in 1935.
The adoption of the ordinance was a response to the sudden increase in mixed marriages, which were resulting in a strain on the
resources of the Pueblo. The appellants sought a declaratory judgment that the portion of the ordinance which denies Pueblo
membership to the children of women, but not men, who marry
nonmembers of the Pueblo is in violation of the equal protection
clause of the ICRA. The district court held in favor of the Pueblo. °
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision and
remanded the cause for further proceedings. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the case and in its recent decision held
in favor of the Pueblo.'
The Rule Priorto Passageof the ICRA
Prior to the passage of the ICRA, the general rule with regard to
internal tribal matters was that the federal courts did not have
jurisdiction. The rule stems from the broad principle established in
Worcester v. Georgia that Indian tribes are sovereign, selfgoverning entities subject only to the plenary power of Congress.'
The decision in Talton v. Mayes interpreted the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty to include exemption of tribal governments from
federal constitutional limitations, and this interpretation has been
followed in later federal court decisions."
The ability of a tribe to define its own membership has long
been included as an aspect of its sovereign nature.'" Courts have
6. 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975), rev'd540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd 98 S.Ct.
1670 (1978).
7. 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
8. 98 S.Ct. 1670(1978).
9. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
10. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
11. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 210 (1973); Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d
1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1976); Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1976); James v.
Wilson, 521 F.2d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 1975); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 241 (9th Cir.
1974).
12. The Court of Appeals of New York in Patterson v. Council of Seneca Nation, 245
N.Y. 433, 438, 157 N.E. 734, 736 (1927), declared that the power of an Indian government
to decide questions of membership derives from its status as a separate nation, and concluded that ".bove all, the Seneca Nation retains for itself the power of determining who are
Senecas, and in that respect is above interference and dictation." The holding in Patterson
has been influential in several recent decisions concerning tribal membership conflicts.
These include the case of Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir.) cert.
denied,356 U.S. 960, reh. denied,357 U.S. 924 (1957), and the post-ICRA case of Fondahn
v. Native Village of Tyonek, 450 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1971), where the court based its holding
on pre-ICRA law in adopting the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Martinez. See also Roff
v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897); Waldron v. United States, 143 F. 413 (C.C D.S.D. 1905).
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for many years consistently recognized that in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has the complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership.'"
It has been regarded as necessary to the self-preservation and integrity of a tribe, and except in those areas specifically limited by
Congress, the necessity for self-determination has been seen as
paramount in decisions affecting tribal membership.
This brief overview outlines the judicial interpretation of federal
Indian policy with respect to Indian sovereignty and tribal ability
to determine membership that had developed up to the time the
ICRA was passed in 1968. The following discussion of judicial interpretations of the equal protection clause of the ICRA should be
read within this historical perspective.
The Equal Protection Clause as a Basis for FederalJurisdiction
One fundamental question, which has now been decided by the
Supreme Court in Martinez,'4 was whether the equal protection
clause of the ICRA (§ 1302(8)) actually furnished a basis for
federal jurisdiction. Decisions after the passage of the ICRA and
before Martinez that dealt with tribal membership conflicts were
concerned mainly with this issue in view of the fact that there is no
explicit authorization for federal jurisdiction in the Act.' Also, as
discussed above, cases decided prior to the passage of the Act had
held that such questions are internal tribal matters and are
therefore outside federal jurisdiction.'" The courts generally concluded that the equal protection clause did provide them with
jurisdiction, either on its own or in conjunction with Section
1343(4) of Title 28 of the United States Code.'7 This statute provides that district courts shall have "original jurisdiction of any
civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any
person: ... (4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other

13. See Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe v. Puckkee, 321 F.2d 767, 770 (10th Cir.
1963); Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir. 1957). See also F.
COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 133 (1971 ed.), where the author lists examples of tribal
authority in this area. A tribe may, for example, regulate the abandonment of membership,
the adoption of nonmembers into the tribe, and the types of membership which it may
choose to recognize.
14. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
15. See Laramie v. Nicholson, 487 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 871
(1974); Thompson v. Tonasket, 487 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 871
(1974); Fondahn v. Native Village of Tyonek, 450 F.2d 520 (10th Cir. 1971); Yellow Bird v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438 (D.S.D. 1974).
16. See text accompanying notes 9-13, supra.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948).
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relief under any act of Congress providing for the protection of
civil rights, including the right to vote.""
The reasoning behind acceptance of jurisdiction was often
couched in terms of an implied waiver of immunity by tribal
governments. This assumption of an implied waiver of immunity
can be seen in several Ninth Circuit decisions, starting with
Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, decided in early
1973, regarding revocation of a lease of tribal land, and in the
companion cases of Thompson v. Tonasket' and Laramie v.
Nicholson," decided later the same year, which dealt with tribal
membership conflicts.
The Tenth Circuit had not decided the question of jurisdiction
before Martinez came before the District Court of New Mexico in
1975." The district court discussed the problem of jurisdiction at
length, apparently agreeing with the implied waiver reasoning of
the Ninth Circuit in Laramie,' Thompson," and Johnson,"s and
accepted jurisdiction over the tribal conflict." The appeals court,
citing its recent decision in Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United
States," upheld the district court's jurisdictional determination. "
The issue of whether the Act may be interpreted impliedly to
authorize actions against tribal governments was considered the
threshold issue by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in
Martinez,"
The Supreme Court noted that tribal governments have long
been recognized as possessing a common law immunity from suit
that is traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." Citing United
States v. Testan,' which stated that a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed,
the Court held that the Act does not authorize such actions."
"Nothing on the face of Title I of the ICRA," stated the Court,

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
484 F.2d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1973).
487 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1973). cert. denied,419 U.S. 871 (1974).
487 F.2d 315, 316 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 871 (1974).
402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975).
187 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,419 U.S. 871 (1974).
,487 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,419 U.S. 871 (1974).
.184 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973).
.102F. Supp. 5, 6-11 (D.N.M. 1975).
515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
540 F.2d 1039, 1042 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
98 S.Ct. 1670, 1673-74 (1978).
Id. at 1677.
424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
98 S.Ct. 1670, 1674 (1978).
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"purports to subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts
in civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief."33
With the assumption of jurisdiction by the federal courts in matters covered by Section 1302, the federal courts were dealing, in
many instances, with very different customs and lifestyles. Intrusion into tribal affairs was greater than ever before and severely
detrimental to the current congressional goal of tribal governmental development and self-determination. The Supreme Court's
decision in Martinez" is in accord with these goals. The Supreme
Court noted that providing a federal forum for Section 1302 issues
would constitute an interference with tribal autonomy and selfgovernment beyond that created by the change in substantive law
itself." It also recognized that such interference might infringe on
the right of Indians to govern themselves and could not help but
"unsettle a tribal government's ability to maintain authority.""
Under slightly different reasoning, the Court also noted that
resolution of issues under Section 1302 will "frequently depend on
questions of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums may
be in a better position to evaluate than federal courts."37
These conclusions are in accord with the criticisms by many
tribal leaders, especially leaders from the pueblos of the
Southwest, of the acceptance by the federal courts of jurisdiction
over cases involving internal tribal matters." The pueblos have
been one of the most outspoken Indian groups in their reaction
against both the passage of the ICRA and its subsequent interpretations by the federal courts."0 Leaders from the pueblos were
concerned that the federal courts would require the same standards in their interpretation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the ICRA that are required of state and federal
governments and would not be sensitive to nor allow for differences in Indian social and cultural life."0 Soon after the ICRA
33.
34.
35.
35.
37.

Id. at 1677.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1684.

38. See Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of JudicialError in Construction of the CivilRights Act, 20 S.D. L. REv. 1, 42-44 (1975).
39. See Burnett, An HistoricalAnalysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights'Act, 9 HARV. J.
LEGIS, 557, 601 (1972). Burnett, in summing up the reaction by the Indian tribes to the ICRA
in its proposal stages, divided the reaction into four types. The fourth type was shown principally by the Pueblos. "The old, stable, and very traditional Pueblo communities," observed Burnett, "were in no way convinced that the values which their system embodied were
inferior to those of white America. They resisted measures which threatened their culture
or the structure of their authority. Their position, he stated, "was clear and unyielding."
40. Ziontz, supra note 38.
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was passed, the pueblos asked to be exempted from its provisions
and in response to their criticism of the Act, the Senate held hearings in Albuquerque, New Mexico." Pueblo representatives again
voiced their concern over the Act in 1973 at the American Indian
Lawyers Association.
The concern of tribal leaders over federal court interpretations
of the due process and equal protection clauses of the ICRA was
warranted by the similarity of the language in the ICRA to that in
the Federal Bill of Rights and by the application by some federal
courts of similar standards to both sections. 3 This concern proved
well grounded. The cross application of standards that the tribal
leaders had anticipated can be seen in the opinion of the Tenth
Circuit in Martinez." In its decision the court stated that while the
fourteenth amendment standards do not apply with full force,
"the I'ndian Bill of Rights is modeled after the Constitution of the
United States and is to be interpreted in the light of constitutional
law decisions.""5
Problems with FederalCourtJurisdiction
Acceptance of jurisdiction by the federal courts over Section
1302 issues created many difficulties for the federal courts. The
district court and appellate court opinions in Martinez exemplify
many of the difficulties. 6 This case and others will be discussed to
illustrate why the Supreme Court decision in Martinez rejecting
jurisdiction is favorable for tribal governments.' Prior to the
Martinez8 decision, the federal courts were inconsistent in their
interpretations of the provisions of Section 1302. Several courts
stressed the need for tribes to be able to maintain their unique
heritage and tribal integrity.' One decision went so far as to
recognize that tribes should be able to maintain traditional practices that conflict with Anglo-American concepts of individual
41. IearingsBefore the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, ConstitutionalRights of theAmerican Indian, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
42. SeeZiontz, supranote 38.
43. SeeJohnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973).
44. 5,40 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976).
45. Id. at 1047.
46. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975), rev'd 540 F.2d 1039
(10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
47. 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
48. Id.
49. E.g., Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 238 (9th Cir. 1976) (tribal
council membership); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 842 (8th Cir. 1975) (tribal elections);
O'Neal v.Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1144-46 (8th Cir. 1973) (exhaustion
of tribal remedies required).
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freedom.-' The Fourth Circuit, in its decision in Crowe v. Eastern
1 concluded that the
Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc."
ICRA was
designed to ensure only that the existing laws of tribal governments were applied with an even hand. 2 The tribal controversy
was to be decided by the traditions and customs of the tribe and
not by the common law, as the court felt that it could not
substitute its judgment on the merits of the case for that of the
tribe. 3 Another recent decision, Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai
Tribes," held that tribes could structure their governments as they
chose, so long as they did not violate due process or equal protection."5
The standards for interpretation as applied by the courts have
varied with the subject matter of the dispute. For example, the
courts have usually shown a flexible view with regard to blood
quantum requirements. Such requirements are analogous to
membership requirements in many ways." Blood quantum requirements would be unconstitutional under the Federal Bill of
Rights but have been found to be a valid requirement of tribal
membership because of the special needs of Indian tribes. Several
cases have held that such requirements provide a legitimate means
for a tribe to limit its membership. 7 It is through the use of blood
quantum requirements that most tribes define themselves for
0 the Eighth Cirmembership purposes." In Daly v. UnitedStates,"
cuit, citing Groundhog v. Keeler,' recognized that "such requirement [blood quantum], if applied uniformly, is not in conflict with
the Indian Civil Rights Act's guarantee of equal protection of the
laws." '° Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,"' a later case citing
50. Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (D.S.D. 1974), rev'don othergrounds, 521
F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975) (termination of employment).
51. 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974).
52. Id. at 1236-37.
53. Id.
54. 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976).
55. Id. at 240.
56. Judge Doyle, writing for the Circuit Court in Martinez, explicitly disagrees with this
viewpoint. 540 F.2d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 1976).
57. Early cases include Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906); Waldron v.
United States 143 F. 413 (C.C.S.D. 1905). See also COHEN, supra note 13, at 133-39. Recent
cases include Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442
F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971); Slattery v. Arapaho Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir.
1971); Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438 (D.S.D. 1974).
58. Other methods include residence requirements and adoption, with the trend being
one of requiring the sharing of tribal obligations. COHEN, supra note 13, at 136
59. 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973).
60. 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
61. 483 F.2d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 1973).
62. Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438, 440 (D.S.D. 1974).
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both Groundhog and Daly, suggested that there is a parallel
between the blood quantum requirements discussed in Daly and
the requirements for tribal membership, and held that this parallel
between the two required the court to find that the membership
provisions of the Oglala Sioux Tribal Constitution should not be
embraced in the Indian Bill of Rights. 3 The decision of the court to
refuse to apply the Indian Bill of Rights was thereby distinguished
from the Ninth Circuit's earlier case of Laramie,4 in which the
court found a denial of equal protection of tribal laws pertaining
to membership because the tribal council was applying its own
law in a discriminatory manner.
The district court in Martinez appears to be one of the first
courts to explicitly consider customs, lifestyle, and tribal history
at length in formulating its decision." An important consideration
was the conclusion that, while the membership provision (the ordinance) was of recent origin, it was nevertheless based on criteria
traditionally employed by the tribe.- The court decided that the
equal protection clause should not be construed in a manner that
would invalidate such an ordinance, and thus require the court to
determine which cultural values should be preserved and which
should be abrogated. 7 The opinion stressed the need for the
Pueblo to be able to define for itself who can be a member of the
tribe. Membership policies, said the court,
Are no more or less than a mechanism of social, and to an extent psychological and cultural, self-definition. The importance of this to Santa Clara or to any other Indian tribe
cannot be overstressed ....

If its ability to do this is limited

or restricted by an external authority, then.., the culture of
Santa Clara is inevitably changed."
However, the opinion of the Tenth Circuit concluded instead
that the ordinance was of recent origin and thus did not merit the
force that would be attributed to tradition." It also concluded that
the ordinance originated as a result of economic considerations
and for that reason was an arbitrary and expedient solution to the
problem that was then confronting the tribe."0
63. Id.
64. Laramie v. Nicholson, 487 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 871
(1974).
65. 402 F. Supp. 5, 12-16 (D.N.M. 1975).
66. Id. at 18.
67. Id.
68. H. at 15.
69. 5 10 F.2d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 1976).
70. Id.
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The decision by the circuit court that Santa Clara's method of
determining its membership was not fundamental to its cultural
survival not only appears contrary to previous judicial decisions
and much of federal Indian policy regarding the importance of
membership policies to a tribe, but it is also contrary to the information presented in the Memorandum Opinion of the district
court7 ' and to information gained through anthropological studies
of the Pueblo cultures." The ordinance in question was enacted
soon after the resolution of a lengthy and bitter controversy which
for a time had split the Pueblo into two factions. The controversy
concerned the importance of traditional customs and values and
the way in which the Pueblo was to interact with the Anglo
culture around it. Such controversy, or factionalism, has long
been inherent in Pueblo culture and antedates Pueblo encounters
with the Spanish in the 1500's."3 Factionalism disputes have been
commented on frequently in studies of Pueblo communities and
there are a number of specific studies of Pueblo factionalism."4 Factions are not a newly developed response to outside acculturative
pressures, but part of a characteristic deeply rooted in Pueblo
culture. They are seen as one consequence of the conservative and
authoritarian nature of Pueblo culture which results in the
elimination of controversial elements within their communities,
and which has allowed the Pueblo culture to remain relatively
stable over the centuries.' To allow the Anglo-American judicial
system to oversee the adjudication of conflicts in Pueblo culture in
an attempt to make the Pueblo conform to an Anglo-American
conception of justice, could have drastic consequences for the
Pueblo's cultural survival.
The appellate court also considered the legislative history of the
ICRA and noted that while it failed to provide a conclusive answer
for construing the Act, the proceedings did manifest a congressional intent to recognize the specific constitutional guarantee
unless the tribal custom or principle outweighs the specific
guarantee."' The ability to control and define tribal membership
must therefore be weighed against the need to safeguard federal
71. 402 F. Supp. 5, 12-16 (D.N.M. 1975).

72. See Dozier, Factionalism at Santa Clara Pueblo, 5 ETHNOLOGY 172-85 (1966); Fox,
Veterans and Factionsin Pueblo Society, 61 MAN. 173-76 (1961); Hawley, An Examination
of Problems Basic to Acculturation in the Rio Grande Pueblos, 50 Am. ANTHROPOLOGIST
612-24 (1948).
73. Dozier, Factionalism at Santa Clara Pueblo, 5 ETHNOLOGY 172, 175, 185 (1966). The
author is an anthropologist and a native Santa Claran.
74. Id. at 172.
75. Id. at 175.
76. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1045 (10th Cir. 1976).
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constitutional guarantees. The court, using the compelling interest
test, then concluded that while the necessity to control tribal
membership is important in preserving the tribe's culture, it was
not compelling enough to justify deviation from the fourteenth
amendment standard." Thus, tribal interest must be "compelling"
enough to outweigh the need for upholding the constitutional
guarantee against discrimination. However, Judge Doyle, in using
the weighing test, did not give the traditional and customary
values of the Pueblo the attention such values deserve. The need
of the Pueblo to show a compelling interest puts the burden on the
Pueblo to show that the particular ordinance in question is
necessary to the cultural integrity of the tribe. Most rules embodying cultural distinctions would fail under this test, because no one
of them would be considered as indispensable to the cultural integrity of a tribe." Indeed, the whole concept of culture is founded
on the premise that it is an abstraction, an intangible that cannot
necessarily be summarized in any trail list or outline of rules." To
attempt to characterize those aspects of a culture that are "of compelling interest" from those that are not, appears from this viewpoint as an almost impossible task. A cultural distinction embodied in particular rules may serve only a small function in a
culture and yet the vitality and continued existence of the entire
system of rules depends on the preservation of its component
parts.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Martinez noted that tribal forums are
available and have been recognized by lower courts as appropriate
to enforce rights created by the ICRA.' The forum provided by
Santa Clara's judicial system, while different from that of the
Anglo-American system, was traditionally an effective one."2 Now
incorporated under the Indian Reorganization Act," the Pueblo's
77. Id. at 1047.
78. Note, Equal Protection Under the Indian Civil Rights Act: Martinez v. Santa Clara

Pueblo. 90 HARv L. REV. 627, 630 (1977).
79. Kroeber & Kluckhohn, "Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions,"
Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Vol. XLVII. pp.
155-56 (Harvard University, 1952).
80. Note, Equal Protection Under the Indian Civil Rights Act: Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo, 90 HARV L. REV 627, 630 (1977).
81. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1681 (1978). The Supreme Court
cites Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) and Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
82. Aberle, The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico: Their Land, Economy, and Civil
Organization,Memoir No. 70,50 AM. ANTHRO ASSN 1-93 (1948)
83. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 983).
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government consists of legislative, judicial, and executive functions that are defined in the constitution and by-laws. The
Pueblo's governmental organization includes aspects of both the
Anglo and traditional tribal system in the present form of government.' It is thus neither wholly traditional nor wholly Anglicized.s The persistence of the traditional method of choosing officers can be seen, for instance, in the fact that the summer moiety
chief, a traditional officer, is permitted to choose the slate of officers to be elected under its present form of government. The
legislative, judicial, and executive power in the Pueblo is vested in
the Pueblo Council, which thus has sole power.'
Briefly, the judicial system of Santa Clara Pueblo can be
described as follows; The Pueblo court consists of the governor of
the Pueblo and the Council, and sitting together, they adjudicate
all prohibited conduct. In controversies coming before the Council, the body examines all witnesses and ascertains full details of
the dispute. Deliberations may take days or weeks; some cases
may last for years. The defendant, plaintiff, and witnesses give
their full stories without interruption and each individual is allowed
to talk as long as that person wishes. After the matter has been
sufficiently commented upon by the interested parties, the Council
then makes a decision. 7
In the decision of the conflict between Julia Martinez and the
Pueblo Council regarding enforcement of the membership ordinance, the Council was adhering to an ordinance which had
been in effect and accepted by the tribal members since 1939. The
Council was also following formalized procedure established by
the tribal constitution and by-laws. The Council could have
amended the ordinance but chose not to do so. "The policy of the
Pueblo is clear," stated the district court in its Memorandum Opinion on jurisdiction, "and the matter has been resolved by the
Pueblo-against the plaintiffs."' The decision of the Pueblo Council should have been final. The Supreme Court decision now affirms this view and it is clear that tribal forums are to be used to
resolve disputes concerning rights granted by the Indian Civil
Rights Act. This is a significant development for tribal governments which will reinforce tribal authority over internal matters.
This reinforcement provides a much needed step in developing
84. E. DOZIER, THE PUEBLO INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 191 (1970).
85. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 13 (D.N.M. 1975).

86. DOZIER, supra note 84.
87. Aberle, supra note 82, at 28-30.
88. See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 10 (D.N.M. 1975).
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and maintaining responsible tribal government. Tribal judicial
systems have major responsibility in enforcing the substantive
guarantees contained in the Indian Civil Rights Act. Tribal
governments will be relied on to actively assume responsibility for
protecting the rights of individual members. It should be realized
that the decisions they make, while at times not in accord with
Anglo-American concepts of justice and equality, may still afford
equality under the laws and traditions of the tribe. It should also
be realized that such decisions may be necessary for the continued
vitality and existence of the tribe. For example, the Pueblo Council's decision in the membership dispute would not be in accord
with Anglo-American concepts of sexual equality, but was seen by
the Pueblo Council as necessary to the maintenance of separate
cultural identity.
The Supreme Court decision in Martinez" should have the effect oJ. reinforcing recognition that tribal forums are not only
capable of final determination of the issues before them, but that
often i:hey are better qualified than the federal courts to resolve
such issues. Tribal forums are in a better position to understand
the background of the tribal laws under discussion, and the effect
of these laws on the tribe, its culture and lifestyle. Thus, they can
often make a more meaningful determination of the issues because
of their knowledge of the context in which these issues are placed.
As the district court opinion in Martinez stated at the conclusion
of the opinion:
Iuch has been written about tribal sovereignty. If those
words have any meaning at all, they must mean that a tribe
can make and enforce its decisions without regard to whether
an external authority considers those decisions wise. To
abrogate tribal decisions, particularly in the delicate area of
membership, for whatever "good" reasons, is to destroy
cultural identity under the guise of saving it.'
Tribal governments have been arguing in favor of this proposition
for many years and it has now received explicit recognition by the
Supreme Court.

89. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
90. 402 F. Supp. 5. 18-19 (D.N.M. 1975).
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